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ABSTRACT
Mass-marketing frauds (MMFs) are on the increase. Given
the amount of monies lost and the psychological impact of
MMFs there is an urgent need to develop new and effec-
tive methods to prevent more of these crimes. This paper
reports the early planning of automated methods our in-
terdisciplinary team are developing to prevent and detect
MMF. Importantly, the paper presents the ethical and so-
cial constraints involved in such a model and suggests con-
cerns others might also consider when developing automated
systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mass-marketing fraud (MMF) is a serious, complex, and
organized crime. Examples include: foreign lotteries and
sweepstakes (in which the victim believes they have won
money from a lottery and are told to pay a fee in order to
release the funds), ‘419’ scams (advance fee fraud, in which
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victims believe that for a small amount of money they will
make a large fortune), and romance scams (taken in by a
fake online dating persona, in which the victim sends the
‘fake persona’ money) [10, 11]. Some MMFs are low-value
one off scams on large numbers of victims, whilst others
involve developing a relationship (e.g., romantic, business,
friendship) where money is defrauded over time, again with
multiple simultaneous or sequential victims.
Victims of MMF suffer both financial losses and psycho-
logical impacts, with psychological effects sometimes out-
weighing the financial impact, even when large sums of money
are lost [12]. Psychological harm can include: shame, guilt,
embarrassment, depression, feeling suicidal, grief, anxiety,
and loss of trust. Catching and prosecuting MMF criminals
is a difficult task. This is for three main reasons: (1) the
criminals often live in a different country to the victims, (2)
the methods the criminals use that make them difficult to
trace, and (3) prosecution is very time consuming, owing to
the large amounts of online data that need to be analysed to
establish evidence against the criminals and gain intelligence
about their whereabouts and operating tactics.
Law enforcement and others have attempted to prevent
the crime by using disruption tactics. Dating sites, for in-
stance, have been asked to share known fake profiles in or-
der to help reduce the number of criminal profiles. Face-
book has attempted to take down known fake profiles. Anti-
Money Laundering regulations increase the identifiability of
transactions and recipients when money is transferred via
money transfer companies, such as Western Union and Mon-
eyGram.
There are also numerous guidelines, campaigns, websites,
and phone apps available that attempt to educate users
about scams in an attempt to prevent victimisation aris-
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ing from MMF. They suggest basic rules such as: never
click on a link in an email; never respond to an email asking
for confirmation of banking details; never send any money
to strangers you met online, etc. Warnings about online
security often focus exclusively on idealised individual be-
haviour, and assume that people fall for scams because they
lack knowledge. However, researchers have found that many
victims who fall for MMFs have heard of these scams, some
having detailed knowledge [5]. Lea et al., argue that de-
tailed knowledge of a scam increases vulnerability, as these
individuals often develop an “illusion of invulnerability” [5].
It has been found that even when authority figures (e.g.,
police, law enforcement, bank managers) attempt to alert
a person to the fact that they have become a victim of
a romance scam, the victim often has difficulty believing
them. Moreover, even when the victim questions the crimi-
nal about his/her authenticity, the criminal will employ per-
suasive techniques to convince the victim [11]. The number
of repeat victims also suggests that this is a difficult popula-
tion to help to recognise scams. Given that knowledge about
a scam, therefore, may not be enough to prevent individuals
from becoming defrauded, other types of interventions are
needed.
One of the problems with recognising a scam is that fraud-
sters are very proficient at taking up assumed identities as
well as developing trusting relationships with potential vic-
tims. Moreover, some individuals might be more vulnerable
to trusting a scam, compared with others [1, 6]. Criminals
employ a range of persuasive techniques and for some scams
‘groom’ individuals, waiting for the right moment to start
making requests for money.
It has also been argued that“falling for a scam comes down
to errors in decision-making”, and “scammers create situa-
tions (with their scam offers) that increase the likelihood of
poor decision- making” [5]. Cognitive (e.g., overconfidence
in a specific topic) and motivational (e.g., the scam triggers
positive emotions) processes also explain the psychological
reasons for responding to scams. The most consistent find-
ing with regards to reasons why people are scammed include:
‘appeals to trust and authority’ (i.e., the use of people or in-
stitutions of authority to make the scam appear legitimate)
and ‘visceral triggers’ (triggers employed to make potential
victims focus on huge prizes and imagined positive future
emotional states).
Given the problems users have with identifying scams, in
our research we are exploring the use of automated pro-
cesses to identify communication with a potential scammer
and hoping to do so prior to the ‘sting’ taking place (i.e.,
prior to any loss of monies). Such automated mechanisms
will need to make decisions about the probability of a victim
communicating with a scammer by drawing upon their per-
sonal and potentially others’ personal communication. This
paper briefly outlines the research being undertaken, while
specifically highlighting the potential ethical and social con-
cerns related to the autonomous agent we are developing.
We also point out how these concerns might relate to the
development of other types of automatic detection systems.
2. DETECTINGCOMMUNICATIONWITH
SCAMMERS
In recent years, scholars in the field of computing science
have studied extensively the problem of large-scale cyber-
crime. In particular, research has focused on operations
that involve botnets and networks of compromised comput-
ers that act under the control of the same cybercriminal [2].
A key aspect of these illicit operations is that they are run in
an automated fashion, and that the malicious activity that
leads to the monetization of the operation (e.g., the spread
of malware, spam, or phishing) is carried out by computer
programs (i.e., malware). Detection is possible due to the
spread of similar content and scripts sent across the Internet
or at clear signs of automated activity (e.g., synchronization
across multiple email senders).
MMFs, however, are more difficult to detect compared
with phishing or even spear phishing. MMFs are especially a
challenge to detect because a) they typically involve commu-
nication with another person, rather than a bot – this means
that crime narratives can vary and are more complex; b) of-
ten the criminal is developing a relationship that appears
authentic to the victims (romantic, friendship, working re-
lationship) over a long-period of time prior to asking for
money; c) they can vary the communication when a user
demonstrates a lack of trust; and d) they use multiple me-
dia channels to communicate with the user (e.g., dating site,
instant messaging, email).
The research being undertaken in our project: ‘DAPM:
Detecting and Preventing Mass-Marketing Fraud’ is draw-
ing from psychology, media and communications, criminol-
ogy and linguistics to help identify deception and persua-
sive communication and evidence of grooming often evident
in MMFs. We are also interested in identifying: the online
identities, other communication and online behaviors typi-
cal of scammers as well as victims. We are also examining
whether the psychological characteristics that are more typ-
ical of victims (e.g., romantic beliefs, impulsivity) [1] might
be detected in victims’ online communications.
We are also examining socio-technical features to iden-
tify MMF. In particular, we are building on Huang et al.’s
work [4] to investigate characteristics of scammer profiles,
such as the utilization of same profile photographs, descrip-
tions across multiple profiles and patters of interaction and
contact with other users (e.g., login times). We are also ex-
amining socio-technical characteristics typical of users, such
as replying to any message they receive or immediately giv-
ing away their phone number. We will utilize supervised ma-
chine learning techniques such as random forests and clus-
tering of profiles to this end.
In addition to identifying technical features we hope to
uncover specific linguistic features: typical of a victim; in-
dicative of scammers’ communication; and indicative of the
interactions that take place between victims and scammers.
For example, previous work has found that victims of ro-
mance scam are more likely to hold ‘idealized’ romantic be-
liefs – that is, believing that they can find a relationship
with someone who will be their ‘true’ love and this person
will be nearly perfect [1]. We might hypothesize, therefore,
that someone who is more susceptible to the romance scam
will write a profile specifying they are seeking out the per-
fect partner. We might also hypothesize that scammers will
create profiles in a similar way and will communication em-
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phasizing how ‘perfect’ they perceive the victim and that
they believe that the victim is their ‘true love’.
We also hope to uncover deceptive communication. For
example, previous work has found that liars tend to use more
words, and these words are more informal and expressive,
compared with people telling the truth. They also make
more typographic errors [13]. It has also been found that
word count is significantly higher in deceptive communica-
tion on Instant Messaging compared with when people speak
the trust. Moreover, individuals who were lying were more
likely to ask questions that they who were being honest [3].
Linguistic indicators of deception, therefore, might help us
to automatically detect mass-marketing fraudsters.
Cultural indicators might also be useful for our agent.
Given that it is believed that many scammers are West
Africans, there may be some benefits into detecting West
African communication in our model.
3. PERSONAL DATA USED FOR IDENTI-
FICATION
In the research for this project we will be drawing on per-
sonal data for our analysis. For example, we will be con-
ducting analysis of profiles from dating sites, employment
webpages and so forth. We will be conducting analysis of
text produced by both the victim and the criminal. We
might also wish to compare communication with the vic-
tim and non- criminals to examine any significant difference
in stylistic features of this communication. Some of this
text, we foresee, will be highly personal communication. In
all instances, we will be able to anonymize the data – be-
yond simply taking out ‘real names’ (e.g., we will anonymize
any occupational roles leak out identity information). Much
of this anonymization we will conduct automatically rather
than manually.
The research will, of course, strictly follow ethical guide-
lines set out by the British Psychological Society and the
UK Research Councils – and so we don’t foresee any spe-
cific ethical concerns regarding the research. Participants
will be giving informed consent and can withdraw from the
research without penalty. Participants’ confidentiality will
be respected and their personal data will be stored securely.
Given we are conducting our research following ethical
guidelines and principles we are not concerned with the
ethics or moral issues regarding our research practice. The
ethics and social challenges, however, which do concern us,
are in the next stages of the project – which will be under-
taken should we reveal effective identification of scammers
in our research studies.
4. DEVELOPINGASYSTEMTOAUTOMAT-
ICALLY DETECT AND WARN POTEN-
TIAL VICTIMS OF MMF
In addition to the identification platform, should our re-
search successfully detect fraudsters, we intend to develop a
proof of concept application to warn users about scam ac-
counts. This application will be composed of a web browser
extension to be installed on user computers. In addition,
the tool will collect information about the accounts that our
backend will detect belong to scammers.
In brief, the system would need to analyze personal data
on the end-user’s machine (e.g., online profiles, emails, In-
stant Messaging, etc.). This could possibly be all data cre-
ated and sent to their personal computers or there might
be a reason to bracket some of these data. In addition to
analyzing the data to make decisions about the probability
that the user is communicating with a fraudster the system
would need to feedback this information to the user – and
would need to do so in a convincing and persuasive manner
(especially given that victims often do not believe others, in-
cluding those in authority positions, such as the police, when
they are informed that they have been scammed [10].) We
will be drawing from expertise in HCI to develop different
types of warning messages and test their effectiveness (e.g.,
visually wording of the messages) [9, 8]. We would therefore
need to build a system that end-users might trust and that
could win the trust over from criminal to the autonomous
system.
5. ETHICAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES
WITH OUR AUTOMATED SYSTEM
The benefits of an automatic detection system are obvi-
ous. Should it be able to detect end-users’ communication
with scammers, it has the potential to prevent victims from
sending money, downloading harmful malware on their com-
puters used later for identity fraud; prevent victims from
forming intimate relationships with a criminal – only later
to be traumatized by the end of the relationship; prevent
victims from creating compromising material (e.g., naked
photographs, cybersex videos) that might be used at a later
date as blackmail.
Despite these benefits, there are nonetheless ethical and
social challenges associated with such a system. The pro-
posed detection system would need to be making decisions
regarding ‘genuine’ people compared with ‘fraudsters’. There
is, of course, the possibility of false positives. False positives
with such an agent have different ramifications compared
with an email that is mistakenly filtered out into the junk
box. Imagine the hypothetical scenario described below:
The end user might be seeking out a partner on
a dating site and the person they are communi-
cating with (referred to as unknown) might be a
good match, with genuine similar interests and
outlook in life. The unknown exaggerates their
attributes (slightly more than users would nor-
mally exaggerate). They are also somewhat so-
cially clumsy and are rarely given attention and
so flatter the end-user in an exaggerated manner,
more akin to a scammer. The end-user is also a
General in the American Army. Given this com-
bination of factors, the system warns the end-
user communicating that the unknown is most
likely a scammer and so the end-user decides to
end the relationship. In this scenario both parties
have found dating difficult and rarely opportuni-
ties present themselves to each person. More-
over, the unknown was unaware that their data
had been analyzed by an automated detection
system and warned the end-user that they could
be communicating with a criminal.
In the above scenario we are left with the difficult choice
of wanting to protect the end-user from potential harm, at
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the same time as still wanting to ensure possible future hap-
piness. Moreover, the unknown has been affected – not only
does this person have their personal data used by an au-
tomated program, unbeknownst to them, to make decisions
about their authenticity, but they have also potentially been
prevented from experiencing future happiness with a well-
suited partner.
One way around this problem might be to treat cases like
the one in the above scenario as data that are presented to
them in a junk box – similar to threats of phishing. Another
way might be to give the case a probability score. Unfortu-
nately, however, one of the difficulties with a victim-oriented
approach to preventing MMF is that victims tend to prefer
to believe the criminal than others who challenge the reality
of the situation (e.g., when law enforcement inform citizens
that they are a victim romance scam they are often disbe-
lieved) [10].
The above example highlights one of the dilemmas we are
faced with in the ‘art of the possible’. The solution might
be that we include more of the human element – given that
it will be challenge to develop a ‘perfect’ autonomous sys-
tem that never makes mistakes. In the scenario given, the
human element might be an alert system providing a series
of steps for the end-user to complete to check the authentic-
ity of the unknown – rather a simple warning message that
they are about to be scammed. Other solutions might be
considering where we place the software – on dating sites to
make decisions, to family and friends that help the end user
make decisions (especially for the vulnerable whose cognitive
abilities are diminished).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, software programs are becoming a part of our
everyday lives, with systems built to automate e-commerce,
medical decisions and vehicles. Despite the popularity of
these systems and the advancement of science to create these
systems, there remains the concern as to how to create eth-
ical autonomous systems – or how to implement such sys-
tems in an ethical manner. It has been argued that software
engineers often “do not cater for the ‘messiness’ of social
life and social research and its continuous impact on design
choices” (p.523) [7]. Different ethical, social and psychologi-
cal concerns might be related to different types of automated
programs. Previous work, for example, has raised concerns
with drones lowering the thresholds to fire when in warfare.
This paper, we believe raises an important concern about
needing to balance the need to help and support individu-
als, whilst still allowing the end user the opportunities they
would have otherwise had in their lives. Moreover, like other
research on automated programs it raises the concern of pri-
vacy. The work we present here will guide our own research
as we develop our autonomous agent to prevent MMF and
we hope will be considered and guide future development of
autonomous agents.
Acknowledgements
The work reported in this paper is supported by award
EP/N028112/1 ‘DAPM: Detecting and Preventing Mass-Marketing
Fraud (MMF)’, from the UK Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences Research Council.
7. REFERENCES
[1] T. Buchanan and M. T. Whitty. The online dating
romance scam: causes and consequences of
victimhood. Psychology, Crime & Law, 20(3):261–283,
2014.
[2] G. Gu, P. A. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, M. W. Fong,
and W. Lee. Bothunter: Detecting malware infection
through ids-driven dialog correlation. In Usenix
Security, volume 7, pages 1–16, 2007.
[3] J. T. Hancock, L. Curry, S. Goorha, and
M. Woodworth. Automated linguistic analysis of
deceptive and truthful synchronous
computer-mediated communication. In System
Sciences, 2005. HICSS’05. Proceedings of the 38th
Annual Hawaii International Conference on, pages
22c–22c. IEEE, 2005.
[4] J. Huang, G. Stringhini, and P. Yong. Quit playing
games with my heart: Understanding online dating
scams. In International Conference on Detection of
Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability
Assessment, pages 216–236. Springer, 2015.
[5] S. Lea, P. Fischer, and K. M. Evans. The economic
psychology of scams. International Association for
Research in Economic Psychology and the Society for
the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, Nova
Scotia, Canada, 2009.
[6] D. Modic and R. J. Anderson. We will make you like
our research: The development of a
susceptibility-to-persuasion scale. Social Science
Research Network, 2014.
[7] A. Rashid, K. Moore, C. May-Chahal, and
R. Chitchyan. Managing emergent ethical concerns for
software engineering in society. In Software
Engineering (ICSE), 2015 IEEE/ACM 37th IEEE
International Conference on, volume 2, pages 523–526.
IEEE, 2015.
[8] A. Sasse. Scaring and bullying people into security
won’t work. IEEE Security & Privacy, 13(3):80–83,
2015.
[9] D. Weirich and M. A. Sasse. Persuasive password
security. In CHI’01 Extended Abstracts on Human
Factors in Computing Systems, pages 139–140. ACM,
2001.
[10] M. T. Whitty. The scammers persuasive techniques
model: Development of a stage model to explain the
online dating romance scam. British Journal of
Criminology, 53(4):665–684, 2013.
[11] M. T. Whitty. Mass-marketing fraud: a growing
concern. IEEE Security & Privacy, 13(4):84–87, 2015.
[12] M. T. Whitty and T. Buchanan. The online dating
romance scam: The psychological impact on
victims–both financial and non-financial. Criminology
& Criminal Justice, 16(2):176–194, 2016.
[13] L. Zhou, J. K. Burgoon, J. F. Nunamaker, and
D. Twitchell. Automating linguistics-based cues for
detecting deception in text-based asynchronous
computer-mediated communications. Group decision
and negotiation, 13(1):81–106, 2004.
1314
